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Introduction
The burgeoning literature on Canada’s national
debt has failed to address two possible causes of the
growth of government debt, namely, philosophy of
social science and the religious beliefs of
Canadians. This paper argues that the modernist
philosophy of science that influenced many scientif-
ic studies of Canada’s debt systematically excluded
consideration of economic, social, and political
demands as well as deliberation on human account-
ability as intrinsic causes of the growth of debt. The
paper argues that the political and economic actors,
who utilised the studies shaped by this modern phi-
losophy of science, were encouraged by this
approach to think the debt arose and could be solved
without directly addressing the accountability of
particular persons and institutions for their actions
and demands. Once evaluation of accountability and
demands is readmitted into the scientific analyses of
the debt, the expanded field of vision allows us to
see that religious beliefs may also have been an
important, unexplored cause of the national debt.
The influence of a mechanistic 
philosophy of science
Social scientists have generated vast bodies of
academic and popular literature on the causes of the
Canadian national debt. The debate over the origins
of the national debt remains sharply divided
between three major categories of causal explana-
tions. The first set of explanations identifies the
cause of the national debt as the failure to maintain
sufficient government revenue. This set of interpre-
tations argues that the growth of debt was the result
of reduced government income caused by lowering
tax rates, opening tax loopholes, and/or implement-
ing various tax expenditures.1 Set against this argu-
ment is a set of explanations suggesting that high
levels of government program expenditures were
the primary cause.  The debt resulted because gov-
ernment expenditures outgrew fiscal resources.2
A third set of explanations, developed at least in part
in reaction to the polarised arguments of inappro-
priate government expenditures and/or income,
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focuses on the impact of high interest rates. These
arguments tend to acknowledge problems on the
government’s income side but identify the high
interest rates used to remedy inflation as the real
cause of Canada’s burgeoning debt.3
Rather than attempting to resolve this stand off,
this article explores two blind spots evident in all
three categories of causal explanations. The first
blind spot is linked to Alain-G. Gagnon’s observa-
tion that social science has had a powerful influence
on policy making.  He states the following:
It was when the state took on a whole new range
of functions such as macroeconomic redistribution
and other forms of sociopolitical engineering to pro-
mote public welfare that the demand for social scien-
tific knowledge on societal conditions and the impact
of intervening in them was generated.  Thus, the
impact of social science on policy is very much a
question associated with the emergence of the welfare
state in the capitalist democracies after World War II.4
The era in which Canada’s debt grew (1970-1995)
falls directly in this post-World War II period, rais-
ing the question of whether the social sciences
themselves may have contributed to the rise of the
national debt.  More specifically, is there something
about the nature of causal explanation in the social
sciences that may have imparted this growth?  In
Beyond Poverty and Affluence: Towards a Canadian
Economy of Care, Bob Goudzwaard and Harry de
Lange argue that the character of modern econom-
ic science is itself one of the key reasons for our fail-
ure to understand and solve a variety of paradoxical
contemporary dilemmas including poverty, unem-
ployment, and environmental degradation.5 While
their study does not directly focus on Canada’s debt,
it suggests the novel hypothesis that philosophy of
science may have influenced its growth.
Goudzwaard and de Lange argue that a mecha-
nistic and deterministic philosophy of science
began to shape economic science in the nineteenth
century.  This modernist philosophy of science
was adopted in response to the deep desire of clas-
sical economists to achieve “reliable objective
knowledge” that is “universally valid.”6 This epis-
temological concern arose among mid-nineteenth
century economists for two reasons.  First,
economists began to realise that the audience for
their work was increasingly shifting from public
officials to scholars. This shift in audience meant
that their economic analyses would have to begin
living up to the rigorous scientific requirements of
the academy, in particular, those standards that the
natural sciences considered the most scientific at
that time. Second, the dominant epistemological
assumptions in the academy—that the world could
be known directly through reason and that this
knowledge would accumulate progressively over
time—were being attacked and discredited.  These
epistemological assumptions were being replaced
in the human and social sciences by a variety of
new ideological interpretations of the world. The
rise and popularity of these approaches directly
threatened the reigning conception of scientific
progress.
In response to these two challenges, nineteenth-
century economists attempted to remake themselves
as a truly scientific discipline by embracing
Immanuel Kant's idea of a “positive, neutral or
objective science.”  Scientific certainty could be
achieved by adopting a universal method of devel-
oping knowledge. Alan Storkey characterises this
foundationalist assumption as follows: “If one could
establish how one knows, sees, thinks, forms theo-
ries or makes propositions, then an unequivocal
method was tooled up for well-formed knowledge.”7
Any academic discipline that aspired to achieve uni-
versally valid, objective knowledge simply had to
adopt this universal method. Its adoption would
guarantee both the neutrality of a science and the
progress of scientific understanding.
The newly adopted method of achieving certain
and value-free economic knowledge, Goudzwaard
and de Lange argue, required economic scientists to
“work out of, or expel from, the study of economics
all economic changes that contained the seeds of
uncertainty. [Economists] needed to arrive at the
point where all that remains for analysis and 
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Goudzwaard and de Lange
argue that a mechanistic and
deterministic philosophy 
of science began to shape 
economic science in the 
nineteenth century.
explanation is what is certain and what one can
make positive statements about.”8
The nineteenth-century economists proceeded to
expel a wide range of human concerns from their
field of study.  Two of these concerns are particular-
ly relevant to the nature of social science analyses of
Canada’s debt. First, economists should make no
judgements about the value of particular economic
needs.  All human economic needs, desires, and pur-
suits must be treated equally as given data.  Needs
provide the straightforward point of departure from
which economists calculate how best to fulfil these
needs efficiently.9 Second, economists must expel
from their field of study all concern for economic
accountability.10 Individuals, organizations, and
entrepreneurs must be treated like objects that react
to facts and processes in a presupposed manner.  As
a consequence, economists no longer asked who
caused the change, but rather what certain econom-
ic things or processes—e.g., slow economic growth
or inflation—are setting in motion in the economy .
The discipline of economics, therefore, no longer
believed that it was necessary or even possible to
assign responsibility for economic damages to real
economic actors.  Economists refused to assign the
cause of economic problems, such as the national
debt, to particular persons, organizations, businesses,
or unions. 
Banishing from the field of study of social sci-
ences all judgements on the value of particular
needs and of human accountability produced serious
consequences. Bob Goudzwaard explores two con-
sequences in “Who Cares? Poverty and the Dynamics
of Responsibility.”11 First, the social sciences began
to reduce people to objects that could only react to
external impulses, not act independently. This view
is still common in most mainstream social sciences.
Second, not only the deciding human persons but
the context in which they make decisions was
increasingly conceptualised as mechanical and
deterministic. In this conceptual universe, causes
are believed to mechanically impact re-actors. The
science of economics, Goudzwaard argues by way
of example, ended up creating a mechanistic labora-
tory situation called the “market mechanism.”  He
states,
[I]n this self-created world, no one will ever ask
the question: Who or which agency has caused that
phenomenon? For the only accepted question is:
What factor has caused this event? Within a
mechanical universe, no person or agent can be
responsible or accountable.  Everyone's behaviour is
presupposed to be stereotypical, to be always the
same if other factors are constant (the so-called
ceteris paribus clause).12
Goudzwaard concludes that in this hypothetical lab-
oratory situation, a social scientist can no longer
talk about deeper human causes if one is confronted
with a concrete socio-economic problem.  The prob-
lem has to be taken as it is, as it presents itself now,
specifically as a disturbance in the working of the
mechanism.  Either it will solve itself, if the
(mechanical) laws of nature are permitted to operate,
or it can be solved by taking the best and most effi-
cient engineering approach to redress it (just as a car
is repaired).  The mechanistic world, therefore, is not
only a world without moral good and evil.  It is in
fact also a world without a real history.13
If the distortions resulting from the widespread
adoption of this modernist philosophy of science
were restricted to the academy, there would be little
cause for concern by policy makers.  However, as
Alain-G. Gagnon notes, social science has deeply
influenced politics since World War II.14 Ideas 
matter tremendously in political and economic prac-
tice. The eminent economist, J.M. Keynes, also
made this claim:
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers,
both when they are right and when they are wrong,
are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world is ruled by little else.  Practical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt
from any intellectual influences, are usually the
slaves of some defunct economist.  Madmen in
authority, who hear voices in the air, are still distill-
ing their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a
few years back.15
When human agents use mechanistic and determin-
istic economics and social sciences to guide their
everyday choices, they are encouraged to misread
reality and to make skewed and distorted decisions.
In their analysis, Goudzwaard and de Lange con-
clude that this philosophy of science leads to public
policies that in practice “usually attack only the
symptoms, not the real cause of economic mis-
doing.”16 It has led economists and policy makers 
to misinterpret the real world and the central 
questions of social, political, and economic “mis-
doing,” namely, “who shapes what and on behalf 
of whom.”17
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The three categories of explanations for the
national debt, introduced above, deal with real and
important causes.  On a deeper level, however, they
fail to identify the central questions of cause.
Obviously, annual deficits and accumulated debts
are the result of governments that either spend too
much or raise too little revenue.  Furthermore, once
a government is carrying a large debt, a high inter-
est rate policy will undoubtedly lead to its growth.
What these explanations fail to answer are the
underlying questions of who made these decisions,
on behalf of whom, and why? In order to answer
these questions, normative evaluation must be rein-
tegrated into causal scientific explanations. Why 
did many Canadians demand more services from
government while insisting on tax cuts? Why did
the Canadian Government choose to overspend?
Why did it not opt to raise more revenue? Why did
government go along with a policy of high interest
rates? Who influenced the policy makers to act as
they did? Why were so many other economic agents
—functioning within corporations, banks, unions,
and consumer groups—willing to go along with this
policy of high deficits and ballooning national debt?
What were the religious beliefs that guided these
accountable agents? What did they believe about
social and economic life, the role of material wealth
in human wellbeing, the nature of the market, and
the role of the state in society and the market?
Social scientific studies that ignore these questions
may encourage the development of policies that 
are inappropriate, unjust, or simply wrong. In this
way, the modernist version of philosophy of science
may have played an important role in causing the
national debt.
The case of the high interest rate policy
Gordon Thiessen, former Governor of the Bank
of Canada, illustrated remarkably the policy-making
mentality created by a mechanistic and determinis-
tic worldview in economics when reacting to media
questions about the widespread trend of profitable
corporations to engage in massive layoffs.  Thiessen
responded that the changes in the character of work
and lost jobs “are part of a necessary process of
change that will result in a more vigorous Canadian
economy.”18 He implied that these layoffs were sim-
ply adjustments to signals from the global market-
place and directly related them to the ups and downs
of interest rates and the dollar.  His statement failed
to address any of the responsible persons who made
the choices in a wide variety of banks, corporations,
investment firms, unions, and households that were
interpreted together as “market forces,” as well as
the religious beliefs that guided these responses to
these so-called “market signals.”
The Bank of Canada, of course, is a key policy
institution implicated in the argument that high
interest rates caused the national debt. The Bank,
run as it is by people schooled in the science of eco-
nomics, has often been quick to cloak itself in the
mantle of objective science. The Bank claims to be 
a technical adjustment institution responding to
market signals.  The Bank and its officials claim
they should not be blamed for its fiscal policies
because they are necessary reactions to external 
market forces.  High interest rates that doubled the
national debt were simply mechanical adjustments
required to rebalance the market. The Bank of
Canada officials behave, and are treated by others,
as though they are automatons reacting to external
stimuli.19
This view of the Bank of Canada’s role in the
national debt assumes that the mechanistic and 
deterministic worldview adopted by the social sci-
ences is, in fact, an accurate portrayal of real life.  If,
on the other hand, the Bank officials are understood
as responsible agents, then the Bank’s high interest
rate policy in the 1980s appears to be more than a
simple reaction to market signals of inflation. The
high interest rate policy could then be seen as a
deliberate choice by responsible Bank officials who,
in light of their assumptions and religious beliefs,
believed that inflationary forces were throwing the
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This view of the Bank of
Canada’s role in the national
debt assumes that the 
mechanistic and deterministic
worldview adopted by the
social sciences is . . . an 
accurate portrayal of real life. 
Canadian economy off balance. These officials,
guided in their selection of policy instruments by
the mechanistic assumptions derived from the social
sciences, decided to implement a scheme of high
interest rates in order to rebalance the economy.  In
reacting to perceived signals, far too little attention
was paid to who benefited and who lost.
To take this point a step further, the Bank’s attack
on the so-called factor of inflation was really a reac-
tion to symptoms rather than to the real causes.
Inflation and unemployment are real, but they do
not exist as independent forces that act in mechanis-
tic ways apart from responsible human agents.
Inflation, for example, is the result of the wide vari-
ety of choices that responsible human agents make
as they engage in all types of beneficial and destruc-
tive economic practices. After all, real, acting
human persons demand more pay, higher levels of
consumer goods, larger profits, and higher invest-
ment returns. Policy solutions to the national debt
need to get beyond symptoms and directly address
human agents, both in the sense of contextual social
and economic actors and institutions, as well as in
the sense of responding political actors. These
actors are the real causes behind high interest rates
and the growth of the national debt.
Mechanistic philosophy 
of science in political theories
The modern philosophy of science shaping eco-
nomics has also influenced the fields of political sci-
ence and policy studies as they decided to strive to
become truly scientific disciplines. A number of the-
ories and approaches within these fields—the gen-
eral idea of factor analysis in the social sciences as
well as specific theories such as public choice theo-
ry and pluralist theory—have been used to explain
the national debt. This literature has been consumed,
in turn, by a wide variety of politicians, bureaucrats,
interest groups, and citizens.
Factor analysis
Most social science studies that utilise factor
analysis share the modern philosophy of science
assumptions of economics. Study after study on the
national debt identifies things, processes, forces, or
classes as the factors that have increased the debt.
In “The Growth of Government Spending,” for
example, David R. Cameron does a cross-national
analysis of the causes of government growth.
Cameron seeks to “determine whether, and if so to
what extent, electoral politics and political institu-
tions contributed to the expansion of the public
economy.”20 He concludes that the political factors
of “occurrence of elections,” “the identity of the
Prime Minister,” and “frequency of control of gov-
ernment by leftist parties” were either irrelevant or
had only a small impact on the growth of govern-
ment.  More important were “non-political sources
of growth,” Cameron suggests, such as “the deteri-
oration of the economy and the rise of unemploy-
ment.”21 While Cameron’s approach offers impor-
tant information about the debt, he limits his analy-
sis to what certain factors set in motion relative to
the growth of government and fails to identify who
caused this growth to occur and what motivated
them to do so.
A factor analysis approach to social science
focuses on forces and factors as the causes of the
national debt while leaving politicians, union lead-
ers, consumers, bankers, and business people free of
responsibility for the nature of their demands and
the character of their actions. Governments and pol-
icy makers that absorb these types of social science
approaches are encouraged to focus on causal fac-
tors in a mechanistic and deterministic manner.
This objective view of social science generates pol-
icy prescriptions that adjust various factors in the
hope of moving the economic, social, or political
mechanisms towards a more favourable equilibrium.
This approach absolves real politicians, political
parties, citizens, business people, unions, and 
consumers of their accountability for encouraging
the growth of the national debt.22
Public choice theory
It comes as no surprise that public choice theory,
or rational choice, is also implicated in utilising a
mechanistic and deterministic philosophy of sci-
ence, since public choice “represents the coloniza-
tion of traditional political science concerns by eco-
nomics.”23 On one level, public choice theory intro-
duces the dilemmas present in economic science in
its definition of the person.24 By interpreting the per-
son as essentially a rational self-interest calculator
who goes about life trying to maximise his or 
her self-interest, public choice reduces the human
person to a reacting automaton.  On another level,
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public choice theory shares the mechanical image of
the universe held by many economists.  People react
to external stimuli from the incentive structures that
make up the particular games in which they oper-
ate, e.g., the political, special interest group, or
bureaucratic games.
As a consequence of these two assumptions, pub-
lic choice theory ultimately fails to hold anyone
accountable for policy outcomes.  A politician who
runs up the national debt in order to please 
constituents and to get re-elected is interpreted as
simply reacting out of rational self-interest to exter-
nal democratic forces. Citizens who demand more
government spending are simply understood to be
pursuing their immediate self-interests. Prescriptive
policies advanced by public choice theorists often
tend to impose technical adjustments to the incen-
tive structures so that individuals—voters, politi-
cians, bureaucrats, and interest groups—react in
such a way as to eliminate the debt. In so doing,
however, public choice theory misdirects the atten-
tion of policy makers to symptoms and fails to
encourage them to question the validity of the
needs, values, and desires of the various actors or to
hold these actors accountable for their choices. In
public choice theory, causality is reduced to deter-
minism within a fixed mechanical field of action,
making a caricature of the independence of human
actors and of our all-to-human, meaning-laden 
societal context. 
Pluralist theory
The political theory of pluralism, which has fre-
quently been used in the social sciences to explain
the origin of the national debt,25 is also shaped by
this modern philosophy of science. Classical plural-
ist theory argues that society is composed of
autonomous individuals who are free to choose and
value as they will.26 These individuals voluntarily
form interest groups in order to persuade govern-
ment to serve their interests.  Since individuals have
many and changing interests, they participate in a
wide variety of different and shifting groups in
accordance with their evolving interests.  Pluralist
theory identifies government action and policy 
as the outcome of interest group competition.  The
government reacts to the demands of various 
interest groups and as a good broker, produces an
appropriate policy compromise. According to 
pluralist theory, public interest policies sponta-
neously emerge from private interest competition.
In “The Politics of the Deficit,” David A. Wolfe
uses a version of pluralist theory to analyse the
causes of the national debt. Although a large part of
the deficit in the 1970s had been caused by cyclical
economic factors, he argues, “most of the remainder
results from the failure of governments to balance
their revenue-raising capacity with the growth of
public expenditures.”27 Why did this imbalance
occur?  The Liberal Party, Wolfe argues, held onto
office for most of the post-war years through “its
ability to balance the competing claims of the broad
political constituencies from which it drew its 
electoral support.”28 These two major constituencies
were the nation’s business class and the large 
segment of the population directly interested in the
Liberals’ social programs. Wolfe identifies the cause
of federal deficits in the 1970s as the failure of
Liberal governments to collect adequate revenues
while balancing the political desires of their corpo-
rate support-base with the political preferences of
their other social-program supporters.29 Thus, Wolfe
concludes the following:
The political constituencies of the Liberal party
have been strongly resistant to allowing increases in
the effective level of taxation commensurate with the
increases that occurred in levels of direct spending.
The Liberal party had risked alienating a substantial
portion of its business and upper income constituen-
cies with what were perceived as overly generous
transfer programs and a disastrous attempt at 
comprehensive tax reform.  The price of repairing
the political damage was a steady stream of tax con-
cessions intended to reassure private enterprises and
upper income individuals that the cost of the welfare
state in Canada would not fall on their shoulders.
Herein lie the political roots of the structural compo-
nent of the deficit.30
The political theory of 
pluralism . . . [like the 
public choice theory] is 
also shaped by this modern 
philosophy of science.
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It is not clear whether Wolfe considers his theory to
be prescriptive or simply descriptive. Nevertheless,
pluralist theorists are implicitly prescriptive when
they argue that the national debt is, as are all policy
outcomes, a semi-automatic government reaction to
the evolving context of competing interest-group
demands. Various citizens and interest groups
democratically demand tax cuts, tax expenditures,
or additional programs.  The government reacts to
these demands by producing a compromise set of
policies that achieves as many of the relevant
demands as possible while ensuring re-election.
While many interest groups and politicians were
democratically satisfied by this policy-making pro-
cess, an unintended and unfortunate consequence of
the combined policies was a series of government
deficits and a progressively larger national debt. 
Thus, the pluralist theory of interest-group politics
also accepts both philosophy-of-science assump-
tions of modern economics.31 First, the expressed
needs and demands of interest groups are not ques-
tioned by scientists but treated simply as data.
Pluralist theory portrays government and politicians
as largely reacting to electoral stimuli and interest-
group demands in order to devise the most efficient
policy possible. Political practitioners and others
who consume pluralist theories are given the
impression that government should not assess the
quality and value of interest group demands nor
should government consider the unregistered
demands of weak and powerless groups. Pluralist
theory implicitly tells politicians that they are
excused from assessing the quality and importance
of private interest-group demands from the point of
view of the government’s public-interest task.
Second, pluralist theory accepts the philosophy of
science assumption that government ought to focus
on what causes the debt, e.g., democracy, while
absolving the whom of high income earners, Liberal
cabinet Ministers, and others of responsibility for
their choices.  Pluralist theory fails to identify the
real agents—in each of their specific offices—who
are accountable for actions that cause the national
debt. By trying to explain the debt without address-
ing accountability, pluralist theory maintains its
deterministic and mechanical view of persons and
the world. Pluralist theory does not encourage us to
ask whether institutions and organizations were act-
ing responsibly when costs that rightfully belong to
them are externalized to government. It does not
encourage government actors to demand that insti-
tutions and organizations consider the public conse-
quences of their private decisions. Consequently,
non-governmental actors are permitted to shift prob-
lems and costs into the public realm under the guise
of interest-group demands, thereby expanding the
government’s tasks and often increasing its debt
load. A corporate decision to lay off employees in
order to enhance the value of their stock, for exam-
ple, increases the employment insurance and wel-
fare costs of government and could potentially make
the national debt grow.
Some pluralist theorists have gone beyond
description to prescribe policy solutions intended to
rebalance the political and economic machines.
Yair Aharoni argues, for example, that democracies
often experience “demand overload” and prescribes
countervailing legislation to balance the democratic
demands of the people.32 This approach has led to a
number of mechanical solutions for government
debt, such as the much-heralded balanced budget
bills and constitutional amendments.  This mechan-
ical type of solution, however, fails to encourage
government, interest groups, and citizens to fulfil
their respective responsibilities and critically exam-
ine their demands.
In summary, modern philosophy of science has
caused a blind spot in the social science literature on
the causes of the debt.  Modern philosophy of sci-
ence has led to social science studies that exclude
normative evaluation of economic and political
demands and downplay the accountability of vari-
ous political and economic agents. Informed by this
type of scientific analysis, politicians, corporate
managers, investors, unions, and consumers were
likely to take decisions that contributed to the
increase of the national debt. A measure of account-
ability for the growth of the national debt, therefore,
should go to social scientists who produced theories
and studies of the national debt based on this mod-
ernist philosophy of science. In order to remedy this
problem, social scientists must increasingly produce
causal explanations that include normative evalua-
tion of who rather than simply what is responsible
for causing the growth of the national debt.
Religious beliefs as a cause of the national debt
Recognizing the blind spot produced by modern
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philosophy of science exposes a second, closely
related blind spot. What were citizens, corporations,
associations, and unions thinking and believing
when they demanded more and more from the fed-
eral government? What religious beliefs generated
the demands that drove government into deficit-
financed programming? Goudzwaard and de
Lange’s approach to the study of the paradoxical
problem of general scarcity offers a fruitful model
for identifying and analysing these deeper assump-
tions and religious beliefs.
The first step in identifying core values,
Goudzwaard and de Lange argue, is to identify the
paradoxical characteristics defining a contemporary
problem and that seem to make it resist commonly
accepted remedies. The paradox of general scarcity,
for example, refers to society’s simultaneous expe-
rience of unmet desires and demands while living in
a time and place of unprecedented wealth. While all
societies have experienced critical shortages of cer-
tain goods from time to time, our society is unique
in that it experiences an ongoing sense of general
scarcity.  Our needs constantly out-grow our eco-
nomic means.  As production grows to meet increas-
ing wants, our needs expand even more rapidly 
and therefore we experience general scarcity.
Goudzwaard and de Lange observe that “Needs in
society have become floating and weightless, as if
possessing no gravity. We no longer anchor them in
what we truly need; instead, we allow them to be
defined by an economic process that requires needs
in order to continue functioning.”33 This deep feel-
ing of general scarcity leads consumers, businesses,
organizations of all types, as well as governments,
to slash essential expenditures and/or run deficits. In
this light, Canada’s national debt—as well as more
recent severe government program and expenditure
cuts—incurred during an era of immense economic
prosperity, are clear signs that the paradox of 
general scarcity has come to characterize Canadian
society.
Five explanations of general scarcity
The second step in identifying religious beliefs,
Goudzwaard and de Lange argue, is to explore the
various explanations for why we feel this paradox.
In the case of the paradox of general scarcity, they
suggest five overarching explanations.34 I have
adapted these to more directly illustrate the linkage
to national debt.
The first explanation for the paradox of general
scarcity identifies advertising as the cause for our
artificially expanded needs and desires. Canadian
society is on an advertising-induced treadmill of
growing wants and desires.  We gladly run up debts
in order to meet these advertising-induced needs.
While this account has significant merit, it is flawed
in that it suggests people are largely reactive and
therefore unable to escape external influences.
A second explanation focuses on the role of time
in creating a sense of scarcity.  It takes time to buy,
use, and repair possessions.  The wealthier we are in
possessions, therefore, the less time we have.  We 
respond to this lack of time by borrowing money to
consume still more new labour- and time-saving
devices that we hope will allow us to get on with
more important matters. These devices save time
only temporarily, however, since as our devices
accumulate, the process of buying, using, and
repairing them eventually swallows up the very time
they were meant to redeem.
The social explanation of Rene Girard constitutes
a third explanation of the paradox of general scarci-
ty. A trademark of all societies, Girard argues, is that
“one person desires things because another 
already has them or wants them.”35 Western soci-
ety’s unique solution to this universal phenomenon
is to increase production and promise to fulfil all
desires. Endless material desire is supposed to be
solved, therefore, by endless economic growth. To
maintain our position in society, we gladly borrow
to consume more. Girard despairs, however, since
this means “the end will never come.”
Modern philosophy of science
has led to social science 
studies that exclude normative
evaluation of economic 
and political demands and
downplay the accountability
of various political and 
economic agents.
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The fourth explanation is based on Hannah 
Arendt’s analysis of the human condition. Arendt
argues that general scarcity is rooted in “a desire by
modern humanity to escape from the earth,” that is,
from the “human condition.”36 This escape involves
transcending three circumstances: social life in its
plurality, the human relationship with the earth, and
the human relationship to time. These three condi-
tions are increasingly viewed by our society “not as
that which forms the substance of life but as restric-
tions that interfere with our desires.” Arendt’s
explanation means that the explosion of means
designed to satisfy our ever-rising material desires is
“a sign of a titanic battle against the human condi-
tion itself.” This battle requires us to go in debt, per-
sonally and nationally.  Goudzwaard and de Lange
draw this conclusion:
Donning the mask of realism, our economic order
has mounted the most idealist live performance that
this world has ever seen, which casts heavy shadows
not only over the environment and the increasingly
impoverished Third World, but also over Western
humanity itself.  For the more affluent we become,
the more we alienate ourselves from our own creat-
ed human condition..37
Goudzwaard and de Lange propose a fifth and
deeper explanation of the paradox of general scarci-
ty.  General scarcity is the result of not only a desire
to escape the human condition but also ultimately a
desire to escape God as creator of humanity. As
such, general scarcity is rooted in core religious
beliefs. In place of God, they argue, Canadians idol-
ize economic growth, aided by science and technol-
ogy, as the means to deliver and ensure human
progress. It is this belief that inspires weightless
wants and deep rebellion against nature. But our
gods of economic growth, science, and technology
have been unable to fulfil our dreams.  Instead, they
have lured us onto an endless treadmill of wants and
debt without any possibility of achieving enough or
finding peace with our natural embeddedness in
time, nature, and society. Goudzwaard and de Lange
conclude, “Our culture faces the dilemma of choos-
ing which god it will serve and which accompany-
ing lifestyle it will follow.”38
Faith in economic growth
Goudzwaard and de Lange’s five explanations of
general scarcity raise fascinating questions about the
religious beliefs of Canadians, those who directly
ran up the national debt and those who presented the
demands that led to the government’s deficit. In the
deepest sense, we might ask, is the national debt a
symptom of a core belief many Canadian citizens,
consumers, corporations, unions, and governments
hold that suggests we can save ourselves through
ever-increasing economic growth?39 In fact, many
politicians and economists in Canada have frequent-
ly defended this belief, arguing that increased eco-
nomic growth is a non-negotiable means of solving
all of our serious social, economic, and environ-
mental problems and of achieving the goal of
human progress.  It is noteworthy, Goudzwaard and
de Lange argue, that the promise that ever increas-
ing economic growth can solve our problems and
produce ever greater human happiness is based on
several unproven assumptions that classical
economists overtly accept and promote. These
assumptions include the following: happiness is
something we can earn, happiness lies directly in
the amount of goods and services produced and sold
in the market, and “the less work we do the better
off we are.”40 In order for the promise embedded in
these assumptions to be realized, an additional
assumption is required, namely that the market must
be left unrestrained.41 This assumption also involves
the ideas that the market must be left to operate free
of government interference; Third World countries
must be open for business and adopt a free-market
economy in order to progress; and “when we allow
the market to do its sovereign work, then every poor
person has the opportunity to get out of poverty.”42
Goudzwaard and de Lange’s identification of
these religious beliefs of Canadian society suggests
a compelling explanation for why Canada’s national
debt mushroomed between 1970-1995. The abrupt
reversal by Canadian governments on the efficacy
of deficits for ensuring economic growth, however,
seems to contradict this thesis. Does the current
emphasis on program cutbacks, tax reductions, and
minimizing the size of government in order to elim-
inate deficits constitute a reversal of these religious
beliefs? In fact, this reversed position on debt leaves
the core values of progress and economic growth
intact, and only questions the instrumental value of
deficits and certain government programs in achiev-
ing the goal of human progress. Our deepest beliefs,
goals, and assumptions remain intact in this post-
deficit era; we have simply changed our minds on
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how best to achieve them.
Conclusion
This paper has identified two blind spots in the
social-science literature on Canada’s national debt.
Modern philosophy of science has shaped many sci-
entific studies of the debt in such a way that they fail
to identify the character of economic, social, and
political demands as well as human accountability
as potential causes of the national debt. This article
concludes that if accountability and religious beliefs
are readmitted into scientific analysis of the debt,
this expanded range of vision will allow social sci-
entists to explore additional causes of the national
debt, including religious core values.43 Identifying
two blind spots in the current analyses of the debt
does not constitute an alternative explanation for the
debt. They are identified simply in order to con-
tribute towards the development of a more fully
human explanation of the national debt, an explana-
tion that enables people to act responsibly in both
eliminating the debt and maintaining just and caring
social and environmental programs.
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